India as a nation went through a very traumatic experience in 1962. Our faith in the impregnability of the Himalayas, the infallibility of our foreign policy and the invincibility of our Army, got shattered. I was then an Instructor at Staff College. I was assigned the task of preparing a Telephone Battle exercise for Staff College on mountain warfare, based on our experience in the Himalayas. I toured the battle zone in the North-East to study the terrain and the course of operations that had recently taken place there. This also enabled me to interact with some of the officers who had taken part in those operations.
The tour of the battlefield and research at Staff College, led one to conclude that there were three main reasons for our debacle in the Himalayas. First, a total mismatch between Indian foreign and defence policies. Second, the loss of élan amongst the officer corps in the Indian Army. Third, an irrational higher defence organization in which the Defence Services were increasingly isolated from the process of decision making in defence matters.
Vital issues of war and peace, concerning the nation were being dealt with in a casual manner. For instance, in September 1962, on his way to Colombo, the Prime Minister had issued a statement to the Press at Chennai, that he had ordered the Army to evict the Chinese from the Himalayas. The Army Chief then at Tezpur, wanted written orders to that effect. A Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence present at Tezpur gave him those orders. This sequence of events showed the extent to which the Army had been marginalized in the process of decision-making on vital defence matters. What followed is a very painful chapter of our history.
It is worth recalling that after the reverses suffered by them in Boer War, the British carried out extensive reforms in their War Office. At Gallipoli, during the First World War, General Sir Ian Hamilton, commanding the Royal Army, was desperately wanting naval gun fire support but this was not available as the Admiral commanding the Fleet had ordered his warships to clean their boilers!
The Gallipoli disaster taught the British the need for ensuring proper coordination between the Services in battle. The need for this, got further underscored with the emergence of the Air Force as a major partner in battle, whether on land or at sea. There was now need for close professional co-ordination between the three Defence Services. After the First World War, the British introduced a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), comprising the three Service Chiefs in their Defence High Command. This arrangement was also adopted by other countries. During the Second World War, the concept of a Supreme Commander in all theatres of war was evolved. Within a few years after that War, the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was made at the national level in all countries, except India. Some countries use different nomenclature for this appointment but the functions assigned are the same.
In India the first recorded instance of higher defence organization flourishing was in the empire of Chandragupta Maurya. According to Megasthenes, the Greek Ambassador in Chandragupta’s court, the Mauryan War Office in the fourth century BC was a combined headquarters for both the Army and the Navy. The Mauryan War Office functioning under the Commander-in-Chief had six boards, each of five officers. These were Infantry, Cavalry, Elephants, Chariots, Admiralty and Commissariat. The War Office looked after a standing Army of nearly three quarters of a million -- 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 9,000 elephants and 8,000 chariots plus an unspecified number of warships. The Mauryan Empire extended from Kashmir to Karnataka and Kamar up to Kabul.
During the British era, India was perhaps the only country in the world which had a single Commander-in-Chief for all the three Services. In 1947, this arrangement was discarded and each Service came to have its own Commander-in-Chief, independent of each other. The nomenclature of the three Chiefs was changed in 1955 from Commanders-in-Chief to Chiefs of Staff. This re-designation has been both meaningless and misleading. In our set up, the Chiefs of Staff are not part of the Ministry. They are not authorized to take any decision on behalf of the Government nor issue any Government orders. These functions are performed by civil officials in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Service Chiefs continue to function as Commanders-in- Chief of their Service. Thus, it is a misnomer to call our Service Chiefs, Chiefs of Staff.
The debacle of 1962 had failed to motivate us to rationalize our higher defence organization. Like the Bourborn rulers of France, we had learnt nothing nor forgotten anything. The status quo remained. However, after the Kargil War a Task Force under Arun Singh, a former Minister of State in the Defence Ministry, was set up to examine India’s higher defence organization. I was the Governor of Assam at that time. Arun Singh asked me for my views on the subject. In my written submission to the Task Force I suggested the appointment of a CDS and for integration of Services Headquarters (SHQ) with the MoD.
While the recommendations of the Task Force on the Management of Defence were accepted by the Group of Ministers, its implementation has been tardy. We have integrated the Services Headquarters with MoD and even re-designated the three SHQs as Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence(Army/ Navy/Air Force).Like the designation of Chiefs of Staff, this re-designation hardly means anything. Authority in regard to subjects of little consequence, have been delegated to Service Headquarters for integrated functioning but all issues of any consequence are dealt with by the civil officials of MoD. In other words the old arrangement of the civilian bureaucracy exercising authority without expertise or responsibility has continued. Even the suggestion that civil servants in Ministry of Defence should be from the Indian Foreign Service rather than Indian Administrative Service has not been accepted. Defence Policy and Foreign Policy being two sides of the same coin, an officer from IFS is far better suited to serve in Ministry of Defence than an IAS officer. I have been of the view that it will be as illogical to have an IFS officer serving as Home Secretary as it is to have an IAS officer serving as Defence Secretary.
In so far as CDS was concerned, a similar attempt has been made to derail the recommendation of the Task Force, accepted by the Group of Ministers and approved by the Cabinet. A large headless Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) has been provided which serves little purpose. Without a CDS, the required professional co-ordination and unified approach is lacking.
It is worthwhile to examine the arguments used by many, for not having a Chief of Defence Staff in India. Before doing so, it is necessary to take note of the considerations that have been militating against the introduction of this appointment. First, is the political leadership’s fear, of the man on the horse back. It is apprehended that the Defence Services will become too powerful and subvert civilian control over the military, a military coup will occur. Second, the opposition of the civilian bureaucracy to any arrangement in which their dominance and stranglehold over the higher defence set up is diminished. Third, the feeling among the smaller Services, particularly the Air Force, of Army dominance in defence policy formulation. Some fear that a CDS may lead to a situation like the one that prevailed before 1947,when the Army was the dominant Service. Fourth,is the inhibitions of serving Service Chiefs that their position would get undermined if the CDS were to be appointed. In a light hearted vein, it is often said that serving Service Chiefs are not enthusiastic about having a CDS but as their retirement approaches, they get converted to the idea of this appointment.
The fear that a CDS will erode the supremacy of the civil over the military is unfounded. The CDS will not be a Supreme Commander. He will only be an Inter-Service professional coordinator with individual Service Chiefs having the right of direct access to the Head of the Government. It also needs to be mentioned that Army Chiefs in different countries have staged military coups but no CDS has ever done so. India’s Defence Services are fully committed to upholding democratic values and in a well established democracy like ours with such diversity, and of continental dimension, the question of a military coup does not arise. In the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff, his functions are virtually being performed, less efficiently by other functionaries.
It is said that adequate coordination is being carried out by the existing Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and this has successfully met our Defence requirements for the last sixty years. Therefore, the present arrangement should not be disturbed. The annually changing part time Chairman of the COSC is in no position to provide effective professional coordination and render unbiased military advice to the Government, without any bias for a particular service. In the present arrangement, controversial issues between the Services get swept under the carpet and differences tend to remain unresolved.
Some people maintain that a CDS may be necessary for nations having global commitments and required to be prepared to fight a global war. The requirement for this appointment arises from the fact that modern war cannot be fought by any Service on its own and has to be a multi-service operation. It has little to do with global or regional nature of a war. Moreover, the huge expenditure on military hardware for the three Services has to be put under the scanner to ensure that wasteful expenditure or duplication in the Services is avoided. All countries in the world and not only the global players have a CDS.
India should not remain the only country in the world without a CDS. Furthermore, the fact that India is now emerging as a global power should not be ignored. The fears of the Navy or the Air Force getting swamped by the Army, which is a much larger Service, are unjustified. The imbalance in the strength of the Services in many countries like Russia, China, Egypt and so, on have not come in the way of their having a CDS. No matter which Service a Chief of Defence Staff may be from, the question of a bias should not arise when he is not encumbered with the responsibility for looking after his Service. After all even in an individual Service, officers from different streams reaching the top position in their Service have always shown due consideration for other streams. Moreover, a CDS, as in most countries, should be a rotating appointment between the three Services. To put such unfounded fears completely at rest, the first two Chief’s of Defence Staff in India should be from the Navy and the Air Force and only thereafter from the Army.
At one stage it was argued that unless there was unanimity among the three Services on having a Chief of Defence Staff, this appointment could not be introduced. After the 1971 war, Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal had threatened to resign if it was decided to have a Chief of Defence Staff in India. The three Services are said to be now in agreement on this issue. Another hurdle is the requirement that both the ruling party and the Opposition should be in agreement on this issue. Hopefully, even this hurdle will also be crossed one of these days.
None of the arguments against having a CDS are valid. It is high time we in India introduce this appointment and also in due course have integrated field commands. This is imperative for efficient, economical and effective functioning of our higher defence organization in both peace and war. National interests should not be allowed to be held hostage to vested interests._
There is no doubt that India requires a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system for its higher defence management. Those who argue otherwise should revisit the Indian experience and realize that the worlds over militaries are getting to understand the inevitable necessity in today’s environment of having a CDS-like system.
Success in a modern war depends on the formulation of a joint military strategy based on the politico-military aim and its joint and integrated execution. At present, under the system that India inherited from the British, the three Services draw up their individual operational plans based on the Defence Minister’s Operational Directive. Only limited coordination is carried out at the operational level and the tactical level.
Given the ever-changing nature of the battlefield, it is necessary to adapt the Indian military system accordingly. Additionally, in a nuclear zed environment it will not be possible to fight single service wars in future. It will be necessary to have joint structures for fighting future wars. For this purpose, it is felt that India must take up the challenge thrown up by the experience of other countries, like the US and UK and find the best way to move forward to the creation of an institution that will ensure jointness and rapid reaction capabilities.
This does not mean that a CDS is the panacea for all of India’s problems in the military sphere. But the point is that such a system will solve many a problem faced by the military today. Be it planning, budgeting or force structuring, the present set-up does not cater for cohesive advice to the Government from the military based on a coherent strategic vision.
Those in favour of persisting with the current status quo claim that the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) system, has worked quite well and therefore there is no need for either a CDS, or integration with Ministry of Defence (MoD), or any further inter-service integration. However, the inadequacies of the present system was clearly demonstrated during the kargil conflict in 1999.
In the wake of this conflict, the Government of India set up a committee under Arun Singh, former Minister of State for Defence, to recommend changes to the existing defence organisation. The committee proposed far-reaching changes to the existing higher defence organization.
The main recommendations of the Arun Singh committee are:
- That the existing COSC should be enlarged by the addition of a CDS who would be the permanent chairman, and a Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) who would be the Member Secretary.
- The CDS was to be the Principal Military Adviser to the Government of India. He would not exercise command over any of the Chiefs or Forces other than those placed specifically under his command.
The Kargil war also led the Government to institute a comprehensive review of the National Security system in its entirety for the first time in the history of independent India. A Group of Ministers (GoM) constituted on April 17, 2000 carried out a review of the recommendations of the four task forces set up to examine, management of defence, the intelligence apparatus, border management and internal security.
The GoM made several recommendation regarding reforms in Defence Management. The processes of implementation of the recommendations were initiated in 2001. While the GoM accepted the recommendations of the Arun Singh Committee, the process of implementation of the top order, namely creation of the CDS became embroiled in controversy. This was both in the political sphere as well as within and amongst the Services.
To ensure a higher degree of jointness amongst the Services and to attempt inter-service and intra-service prioritization, the Government set up the Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS), headed by the Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC), to support the COSC and its Chairman.
The CISC supervises the IDS, chairs all multi service bodies and the Defence Crisis Management Group (DCMG) and is also responsible for the coordination of long-range perspectives plans, five year plans and annual budgetary proposals of the three services in consultation and coordination with the Integrated Services Headquarters, through the COSC.
Its envisaged functions include:
In practice, this has not worked because the CISC has to go through the COSC for all matters and this arrangement is ineffective. The most important point to bear in mind is that there is little use of having a system in place without having the leader, namely, the CDS.
It is contended that while the GoM accepted the need for the CDS, they did not take into account that such a post would only solve problems in peacetime. The purpose of having armed forces is to prepare for a war. And future wars are going to be such as to force coordinated and very quick action from the armed forces of the country. Waging such wars will require theatre commands. The practical way to ensure proper command and control would be for the theatre commanders to report to the National Command Authority through the CDS. The point that needs to be emphasized is that it is necessary to have the CDS and theatre commands, if the system is to be successful in war.
The CDS would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process through intra and inter-Service prioritization. And he should ensure the required “Jointness” in the Armed Forces. The CDS has to be viewed as the ‘Head’ of the Indian Armed Forces in terms of providing strategic control, strategic direction and strategic vision.
Such a situation will allow the Indian armed forces to react quickly and with reduced teeth-to-tail ratios. With jointness it will become possible to bring together and analyse overlapping service aims, both in terms of acquisitions and operational deployment. And finally, there is a need to find means of coordination between nuclear and conventional forces.
The most urgent requirement for the Indian Armed forces is to create the capabilities to be able to apply maximum force in the shortest possible time, in a conflict. This means that the following aspects have to be kept in mind when preparing for the future.
- There is no alternative to transformational strategies. Because of strong institutional biases, experience elsewhere indicates that many of the areas needing reform will need political will and legislative mandate.
- The armed forces have to restructure at the earliest, through the establishment of the CDS and theatre commands. This must be done and we must ensure jointness.
- Force acquisitions need to be made on the requirements of the theatre commands and not on the needs of individual services.
- More effective approaches to jointness, combined arms and combined operations leading to concepts and tactics towards truly integrated operations or even inter dependent operations is the need of the hour. The sensitivity of each Service should
be kept in mind while planning integration and jointness. It is suggested that areas of agreement be worked out first. - Resource constraints tend to make the armed forces focus on force modernization in terms of traditional weapons. Greater attention needs to be paid to doctrines, equipment and forces to respond to unproven and asymmetric threats. Innovation and ‘out of the box’ thinking is needed.
- The answer is to consolidate and rationalize tri-service roles, missions and assets based on scientific and operational analysis criteria. With this approach it should be possible to afford and operationalize the kind of capabilities and forces needed within national resource limitations.
In the present era of strategic uncertainty and rapidly changing threats, military professionals are aware of the necessity of a joint planning staff for the planning and conduct of joint operations so that these can be planned “top down”. The establishment of HQIDS in India is no doubt, a first step. But if the organization remains headless, its functioning will remain disjointed. Also it will never carry the clout necessary to ensure that difficult and sometimes unpalatable decisions are accepted by the three Services without questioning. And finally, it needs to be emphasised that theatre commanders, vital for wartime operations, will only follow a CDS. If global trends are any indication, this is the direction in which India should be headed.
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While the amorphous threat of terrorism can be extrapolated on the basis of what happened on 9/11, this constitutes only the 'visible horizon' of the extent of the terrorists' innovation. They are likely to be on the lookout for new means to cause mass effect, which may even include transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to their intended target. As a predominant part of the vulnerable global trading system, sea-ports and commercial shipping are widely acknowledged to be highly suitable as vectors for delivering WMD. Although the security of airlines has been beefed up worldwide in the aftermath of 9/11, maritime transportation remains a 'weak link' due to the ease of concealment within a ship and the assured freedom of navigation at sea. The growing containerisation of trade has compounded the problem of such illicit transfers.
Launched by the United States in January 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) envisaged screening of all containers at foreign ports by US Customs officials in concert with their host-nation counterparts, before being shipped to US ports - the rationale being "to extend our zone of security outward so that American borders are the last line of defence, not the first." The process involves intelligence-exchange, use of automated 'non-intrusive' screening of containers and use of 'smart' tamper-proof containers.
Initially, the CSI was a conundrum for many countries that had the USA as a major export destination. India was one such country. On the one hand, there were security and sovereignty concerns attendant to the stationing of US officials in their ports (notwithstanding the fact that CSI is a reciprocal arrangement). Besides, compliance with CSI-standards entailed enormous financial investment for advanced technology and port-operations, besides time delays due to container checks. On the other hand, if their ports were not CSI-compliant, their exports would have to be re-routed through trans-shipment ports that were CSI-compliant, which would have led to delays and possibly even disruptions due to congestion in these few ports. This would have resulted in increased costs and ensuing losses, including in terms of competitiveness.
Eventually many countries realised that participation in the CSI would be advantageous in commercial terms due to the increased 'attractiveness' of their ports that enjoyed reduced risk and greater insurance value, particularly with respect to a possible terrorist attack on maritime trade. Furthermore, it was realised that the CSI was unlikely to adversely affect the efficiency of cargo movement: since containers usually await loading at the port of origin, this time period could be utilized for inspecting them rather than on their arrival at US ports.
India has been contemplating joining the CSI since 2003, and many rounds of Indo-US discussions have been held in this regard. However, the primary impediment so far has been the concerns expressed by intelligence and customs agencies about stationing US officials in Indian ports, including their possible intrusion into local port jurisdiction, enforcement and strategic imports. Indian decision-making process has been rather slow, particularly considering that even China lost no time in discerning the dividends of the initiative and made its major ports CSI-compliant. However, recent news reports indicate that India is poised to 'come aboard' the CSI. After 59 other ports in 27 countries worldwide that have become 'CSI-compliant', India's Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) at Mumbai may soon become the sixtieth. The Indian government is likely to take a decision in this regard in the week beginning July 16, 2007. Apprehensions expressed by Indian intelligence and customs agencies are being addressed through a clear codification of rules-of-conduct and 'red-lines' within the agreement.
Like in the case of most other countries, India's participation in the CSI also seems to be largely driven by economic imperatives. The competition amongst commerce-savvy states is palpable, and with CSI acquiring a self-sustaining inertia, India has no choice but to harmonize its commercial activity with global trends. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that automated container screening and information exchange associated with the CSI have lately become security imperatives for India. This exigency has become particularly pronounced after events indicated India's poor record in maritime-transportation security. In October 2004, ten workers at a private foundry near Delhi were killed in a blast caused by live shells in metal scrap that was imported from erstwhile war zones of West Asia in shipping containers. In May 2005, Mumbai police discovered a large quantity of small arms in a container that had arrived from Singapore. Even if these cases are not linked to terrorism, they amply expose India's vulnerabilities. Given that India's container trade is rapidly increasing, investments to provide enhanced security become necessary. India is also better placed among developing countries to afford such investments. As early as in June 2002, the World Customs Organisation (WCO) had endorsed the CSI and passed a resolution to enable countries develop container security programmes in line with the initiative.
Once India joins the CSI, it must look beyond it. The initiative is currently a bilateral 'hub-and-spokes' mechanism envisaged only to cater for the security of the United States. It, however, has the potential to be expanded into a 'global web', beginning with countries like India that are particularly affected by terrorism.
The recently concluded Foreign Secretary level talks in Dhaka between India and Bangladesh saw agreement on three broad issues. The first of these related to sharing of intelligence pertaining to security. Secondly, India agreed to provide greater access to Bangladeshi goods to the Indian market, as earlier announced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the SAARC summit held in New Delhi. And thirdly, the two countries agreed to take steps to implement the 1974 Indira-Mujib land boundary agreement, which has been a long-standing demand of Bangladesh. These talks took place after a gap of two years and that too when Bangladesh is being administered by a Caretaker Government (CTG). The significance of this development lies in the fact that the current 'apolitical' government is poised to remain in power till the end of 2008, which is when parliamentary elections are scheduled.
The Army-backed CTG shares cordial relations with India, which maintained a studied silence in the wake of the former's assumption of power on January 11 amidst a volatile political situation. India had been cautiously watching the growing political instability in Bangladesh and heaved a sigh of relief when elections, scheduled for January 22, 2007, were cancelled. There has been some criticism of the Indian approach among Bangladeshi civil society groups. However, given the overwhelming nature of the India factor in Bangladesh's domestic politics, New Delhi has adopted an extra cautious approach, even going to the extent of ignoring Dhaka altogether. Moreover, the timing of the Secretary-level talks had nothing to do with India's approach towards the CTG as conservative religious parties in Bangladesh speculate. The talks were long overdue and could not be further postponed given that the CTG would be in power till the end of 2008.
Two important issues that have drawn the attention of the media, the elite and of common people alike in Bangladesh are that of trade imbalance and border fencing. The issue of imbalance in trade has been repeatedly raised by Dhaka in the past. India had earlier proposed a free trade agreement (FTA) which, in its view, would help address the issue, and it cited the example of India-Sri Lanka trade relations in this respect. Bangladesh has, however, been reluctant to sign such an agreement given the asymmetric size of the markets of the two countries as well as because of its traditional opposition to bilateralism in its ties with India. Instead, it had expressed interest in a multilateral agreement within the SAARC framework. But the current state of SAFTA is not encouraging, and free trade under its ambit could be time consuming or may not even take off given Indo-Pakistan problems. India in turn offered a unilateral free trade pact to Bangladesh and announced that such access would be provided in phases with both countries sitting down to sort out how to reduce the number of goods on India's list that are protected by this arrangement.
A related issue is that of non-tariff barriers. Standardising products meant for export, the rule of origin principles and inadequate clearing facilities at customs ports have been the major hurdles here. In the foreign Secretary level talks, a decision was taken to address the problem of standardization. Both the Bureau of Indian Standards and the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution will work out a framework to standardize products meant for export to the two countries. Export organizations in Bangladesh are working out a list of such products that would be considered for duty free trade with India. The hope is that India's negative list would not be too long, leading to tougher trade negotiations and delays in the implementation of free trade. This is a practice that has been common to South Asia. Most countries have large positive lists under SAFTA that include all items except those produced in neighbouring countries that qualify for free trade. At the same time, their large negative lists prevent the export of any potential products from their neighbours. It is to be hoped that India's offer of free trade does not end up making trade impossible, thus adding to the list of Bangladeshi grievances.
It is true that Bangladesh's export basket is relatively small. It is also true that Bangladesh has opposed major Indian investments like that of the Tatas because of domestic politics, which in effect sends a negative signal to other potential private investors from India. Citing the lack of an adequate transport network and other facilities, Dhaka has opposed transit and trans-shipment facilities to Indian goods from the North-East as well as the use of Chittagong port by India, which could have earned valuable foreign exchange and improved the overall trade balance. Its opposition to the trilateral pipeline from Myanmar to India through Bangladesh, which would have earned it substantial transit fee, as well as its refusal to sign on to the multilateral Asian Highway project highlight its irrational and negative attitude towards India. In contrast, though its trade deficit with China is comparable to what it has with India, the Beijing-Dhaka relationship is quite free of grievances. Nevertheless, India's recent initiatives are welcome and both countries have agreed to remove non-tariff and para-tariff barriers that constitute major hurdles for trade in the region.
The other major issue between Bangladesh and India is that of border fencing. From the very beginning Bangladesh has been opposed to the idea of India erecting a fence along the border, which it considered to be a defensive structure. But Indian persistence made it reluctantly agree to the construction of a fence at the distance of 150 yards from the border as defined by the Indira-Mujib accord of 1974. Many in Bangladesh perceive the fence as unfriendly and representing lack of trust. In contrast, from an Indian perspective, the main purpose of the fence is to prevent smuggling, illegal immigration and use of a practically open border by insurgents and criminal elements. Though the fence has not completely stopped illegal cross-border movement because of topography and the attitude of provincial governments along the border, the fact remains that it has addressed to some extent the issue of smuggling and people crossing the border at will. Instead of seeing the fence as an unfriendly act, Bangladesh should learn to appreciate the adage that good fences make for good neighbours. Instead of the daily trading of charges about the border being breached, which on some occasions have erupted into the exchange of fire between the two border forces, the fence helps to keep the border tranquil.
India-Bangladesh relations have a distinct politico-economic dynamic and a complex socio-cultural history. The political atmosphere between them has been a victim of domestic politics in Bangladesh. While a fence cannot increase or decrease the warmth of bilateral ties, there are, however, certain practical problems that need to be addressed. People living in the border areas in Bangladesh often complain about flood lights on the fence, which affects their sleep. This light also attracts insects which eat the crops. A second factor that can be addressed is intelligence sharing, given the cross border movement of criminal and insurgent groups. This issue is slated to be addressed in the upcoming meeting of the Home Secretaries of the two countries. Thirdly, the proposed Dhaka-Kolkota Moitree Express, which is scheduled to start regular service twice a week from September 2007, will surely enhance people to people contact.
In addition, the two countries seem to be working closely to improve bilateral relations on other fronts as well. Two joint mechanisms have been established, one on the border and the other on sharing the waters of common rivers. Dhaka and New Delhi have identified the completion of boundary demarcation as well as exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions as issues that require early solution. This new positive momentum in the political sphere needs to be built on by providing a socio-economic structure that would make India-Bangladesh relations fruitful in the long run.
Although it is nearly two years since the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement between President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their intention to facilitate civil nuclear commerce between India and the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the process is still to be completed with even the first step towards that goal, an Indo-US agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, still under negotiations with apparently strong differences between the two countries on a number of issues. Expectations are that the agreement may be finalised by the end of this year. It is, however, most unlikely that the critics of the agreement, both in India and the US, would be happy with the 123 agreement when it is agreed to by both parties. It is, of course, altogether another matter whether they would be satisfied with any 123 agreement! Nevertheless, it would be useful to consider the form a final 123 agreement may take and analyse how it addresses the concerns of both countries. At this point, it would be useful to consider the generic form the US-India 123 agreement should take rather than over analyzing individual components.
Before analysing the issues relating to the 123 agreement, however, some factors have to be kept in mind. Firstly, India is still classified technically under US law as a non-nuclear weapon state and therefore the 123 agreement has to conform to the US legislation applicable to non-nuclear-weapon states. Two, it is extremely unlikely that the US Congress would amend any more laws to accommodate India. Three, India is, however, a de facto nuclear weapon state and accepted as one by the United States and the rest of the international community. Therefore, as a responsible nuclear weapon state, it cannot accept any conditions that would have the effect of degrading its nuclear deterrence. Four, the 123 agreement, in its final form, should (i) enable India to access equipment, components and materials immediately needed like, for example, reactors, fuel etc; (ii) not expressly deny India anything that it may need in the future; and (iii) leave open, if necessary after further negotiations, access to items currently not supplied. Finally, the 123 agreement should not result in any economic loss to India as a result of any unilateral US action.
Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires a 123 agreement to include nine conditions. Of these, one has been exempted for India by the Hyde Act passed last year. The India 123 agreement is required to include the other eight - 123 a(1) and a(3) through a(9). Can a 123 agreement be fashioned within these constraints? It should be possible and that is probably the reason why both countries have been expressing confidence in this regard. This essay concerns itself with the main objections that have been voiced in India and suggests measures to handle them within the parameters outlined above.
Return Clause
One of the sticking points has been the provision of Sec. 123 (a)(4) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), which gives the United States the "right (in agreements for cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states) to require the return of any nuclear materials and equipment transferred and any special material produced through the use thereof, if the cooperating country detonates a nuclear explosive device…" India rightly fears that the enforcement of this provision, in full or in part, would result in heavy financial loss to India as a result of the closure of the reactor(s). There are two immediately available avenues to protect India against such loss.
The first would be for the US President to exempt the 123 agreement from the requirement of Sec. 123(a)(4) - which is allowed under the AEA - with a determination that the "inclusion of such a requirement would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security." It would not be difficult to establish that the failure of the 123 agreement, and the consequent isolation of India from global nuclear civil nuclear commerce, would affect US non-proliferation objectives. And the procedure for the Congress to ratify such an agreement would be identical to the procedure for ratification of a 123 agreement with such a clause. If Congress chooses to reject such an agreement, then the blame for the failure of the Indo-US agreement would lie at its feet and not the two governments.
If, however, for any reason such an action is not considered to be feasible, then the 123 agreement which includes Sec. 123 (a)(4) can be drafted to include one or more of the following two additional clauses. The first would be an unconditional requirement that the United States should take back all the equipment and materials transferred and moreover bear the costs associated with such a transfer! There has never been a case so far of any used reactor being transported to any other place. One cannot conceive any state in the US willing to receive a used reactor, and a foreign one at that, in its territory. In fact India should insist on the United States exercising the right of return of a reactor in case it decides to conduct a nuclear test!
The second would be to require that the United States compensates India for all the losses it would have to bear on account of the closure of the reactor, including costs associated with the loss of revenue on account of closure, loss on account of replacing the transferred reactor with another indigenous reactor and other costs that may occur as a result of the return of the transferred reactor and materials. Such a clause in the 123 agreement would not be unusual. Art. 12(4) of the US-Japan 123 agreement, dealing exactly with such a possibility states "Before either party takes steps to cease cooperation under this Agreement, to terminate this Agreement, or to require such return, the parties shall consult for the purpose of taking corrective steps and shall carefully consider the economic effects of such actions, taking into account the need to make such other appropriate arrangements as may be required."
At the time of submission of the 123 agreement with Japan, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission had voiced its reservation over this aspect of the 123 agreement. In response to this reservation the US State Department, with the concurrence of the Department of Energy, had submitted that "The requirement that consideration be given to the economic effects of termination or suspension merely takes account of the reality that both parties have a very large economic investment in their civil nuclear power programs."
Thus it is possible to allay Indian fears of possible financial loss on account of the United States requiring the return of transferred equipment and materials by inclusion of these two additions or variations thereof.
This paper explores the paradox of US policy on dual-use technology cooperation with China in the face of resistance from a strong section of the security establishment. The paper examines the factors contributing to the current level of dual-use technology business between the two countries. It finds that the US Cold War grand strategy of co-opting China by dividing the socialist bloc has resulted in embedded commercial interests that have been further bolstered by the strategic need for ties with China. To neutralise piqued interests, the United States is constantly engaged in the business of devising safety valves in the form of export controls.
Energy security has become a major component of India's national security thinking and policy as its economy has begun to record high rates of growth. The criticality of ensuring access to foreign oil and gas resources will only increase with time as the gap between its demand and its domestic production widens. Furthermore, India's dependence on the seas is particularly overwhelming for its energy 'logistics' in terms of both its domestic supplies and overseas imports. With the worsening of the maritime security scenario in the oceans around Asia in recent years, as a result of low-intensity threats added to the persisting military insecurities, it becomes exigent to appraise the risk to India's vital energy supplies. This paper assesses the dominant aspects of maritime security that relate to India's energy security. Besides discussing likely military threats, the study also deals with aspects such as shipping and infrastructure capacity.
There is today an increasing acceptance of the concept of defence outsourcing of non-core logistic functions. Outsourcing frees commanders to focus on their primary task and saves resources. The paper attempts a holistic treatment of the subject from conceptual concerns to related practical issues. A brief scan of defence outsourcing the world over leads us to examine benefits that accrue and the precautions that should be taken. The paper goes on to analyse types of functions that can be safely outsourced and suggests a methodology for the entire process. Finally, the paper suggests a well-calibrated phased approach for India with progressive reviews and improvements.
